MIL OSI Translation. Region: Germany / Deutschland –
Source: Die Linke “Anyone who promises secure communication through encryption, but at the same time wants to make secure end-to-end encryption impossible, shows one thing above all else: that there is a lack of knowledge of the fundamental mechanisms of digital society. There are no back doors that can only be used for legitimate purposes in law enforcement agencies. Anyone who finds it could go into my house through an open back door, that’s no different with software back doors, ”explains Anke Domscheit-Berg, spokeswoman for the DIE LINKE parliamentary group on the Internet, with a view to the plan of the EU Council of Ministers to pass a resolution this year forcing messaging services to put in a back door. This is intended to prohibit end-to-end encryption. Domscheit-Berg continues: “Anyone who deliberately creates weak points in communication software is endangering IT security for all of us, creating gateways for criminals who can use it to spread malware on a massive scale and cause unimaginable damage to society as a whole. In a digital society, however, a high level of IT security is indispensable for the functioning of the economy, the state and civil society. The proposed EU regulation is an attack on the integrity of the digital infrastructure and is therefore highly dangerous. It would not create more security, but cause a high level of incalculable risks, not only would the potential economic damage be considerable. As so often in the past, any uncertainty among the population due to current terrorist attacks is exploited to legitimize surveillance measures. Neither the surveillance accounts, which the Federal Constitutional Court repeatedly emphasized, nor the evidence of benefits requested by the EUGH are taken into account. In the EU, European values must be the basis of regulation, especially in the digital world, because we don’t want commercial mass surveillance like in the USA any more than state surveillance in China. However, data protection, IT security and internal security are not contradicting natural laws, no matter how often they are claimed by politicians. In addition, I warn against damage to democracy and the economy: Repeated failures due to simple errors in counter-terrorism and a lack of terrorism prevention with more technical monitoring options to react is classic symbolic politics. Neither with data retention nor with camera surveillance in public spaces, an influence on crime prevention could be proven, this is no different with security gaps in communication software. However, there is evidence that security loopholes that were kept secret out of surveillance interests or that were specially commissioned by government agencies have been exploited by third parties for the worldwide distribution of malware such as Wannacry and have caused considerable damage. There is also evidence of a ‘chilling effect’, which results in restrictions on freedom of expression when there is too much government surveillance. Once again, the EU has not taken sufficient advice from business and civil society experts on IT security and ignored their warnings . That will take revenge if this fatal regulation is actually passed. However, I cannot imagine that it will stand before the European Court of Justice. “
EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and / or sentence structure not be perfect.